Search for: All records

Language has been shown to influence the ability to form categories. Nevertheless, in most prior work, the effects of language could have been bolstered by the fact that linguistic labels were introduced by the experimenter prior to the categorization task in ways that could have highlighted their relevance for the task. Here, we compared the potency of labels to that of other non‐linguistic cues on how people categorized novel, perceptually ambiguous natural kinds (e.g., flowers or birds). Importantly, we varied whether these cues were explicitly presented as relevant to the categorization task. In Experiment 1, we compared labels, numbers, and symbols: One group of participants was told to pay attention to these cues because they would be helpful (Relevant condition), a second group was told that the cues were irrelevant and should be ignored (Irrelevant condition), and a third group was told nothing about the cues (Neutral condition). Even though task relevance affected overall reliance on cues during categorization, participants were more likely to use labels to determine category boundaries, compared to numbers or symbols. In Experiments 2 and 3, we replicated and fine‐tuned the advantage of labels in more stringent categorization tasks. These results offer novel evidence for the position that labels offer unique indications of category membership, compared to non‐linguistic cues.

 

We investigate the extent to which pragmatic versus conceptual factors can affect a speaker's decision to mention or omit different components of an event. In the two experiments, we demonstrate the special role of pragmatic factors related to audience design in speakers’ decisions to mention conceptually “peripheral” event components, such as sources (i.e., starting points) in source‐goal motion events (e.g., a baby crawling from a crib to a toybox). In particular, we found that pragmatic factors related to audience design could not only drive the decision to omit sources from mention, but could also motivate speakers to mention sources more often than needed. By contrast, speaker's decisions to talk about goals did not appear to be fundamentally driven by pragmatic factors in communication. We also manipulated the animacy of the figure in motion and found that participants in our studies treated both animate and inanimate source‐goal motion events in the same way, both linguistically and in memory. We discuss the implications of our work for message generation across different communicative contexts and for future work on the topic of audience design.

 

In sentences such as “Some dogs are mammals,” the literal semantic meaning (“Someand possibly alldogs are mammals”) conflicts with the pragmatic meaning (“Not alldogs are mammals,” known as ascalar implicature). Prior work has shown that adults vary widely in the extent to which they adopt the semantic or pragmatic meaning of such utterances, yet the underlying reason for this variation is unknown. Drawing on theoretical models of scalar implicature derivation, we explore the hypothesis that the cognitive abilities of executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) contribute to this observed variation. In Experiment 1, we show that individuals with better ToM are more likely to compute a scalar implicature and adopt the pragmatic meaning of an utterance; however, EF makes no unique contribution to scalar implicature comprehension after accounting for ToM. In Experiment 2, we replicate this finding and assess whether it generalizes to the comprehension of other pragmatic phenomena such as indirect requests (e.g., “It's hot in here” uttered to ask for something to be done) and metaphor (e.g., “to harvest courage”). This is the first evidence that differences in ToM are associated with pragmatic competence in neurotypical adults across distinct pragmatic phenomena.

 

Human communication relies on the ability to take into account the speaker's mental state to infer the intended meaning of an utterance in context. For example, a sentence such as 'Some of the animals are safe to pet' can be interpreted as giving rise to the inference 'Some and not all animals are safe to pet' when uttered by an expert. The same inference, known as a scalar implicature, does not arise when the sentence is spoken by someone with partial knowledge. Adults have been shown to derive scalar implicatures in accordance with the speaker's knowledge state, but in young children this ability is debated. Here, we revisit this question using a simple visual world paradigm. We find that both 4- and 5-year-olds successfully incorporate speaker knowledge into the derivation of scalar inferences. However, this ability does not generalize immediately to non-linguistic communicative contexts. These findings have important implications for the development of pragmatic abilities. 

Foreign-accented non-native speakers sometimes face negative biases compared to native speakers. Here we report an advantage in how comprehenders process the speech of non-native compared to native speakers. In a series of four experiments, we find that under-informative sentences are interpreted differently when attributed to non-native compared to native speakers. Specifically, under-informativeness is more likely to be attributed to inability (rather than unwillingness) to say more in non-native as compared to native speakers. This asymmetry has implications for learning: under-informative teachers are more likely to be given a second chance in case they are non-native speakers of the language (presumably because their prior under-informativeness is less likely to be intentional). Our results suggest strong effects of non-native speech on social-pragmatic inferences. Because these effects emerge for written stimuli, they support theories that stress the role of expectations on non-native comprehension, even in the absence of experience with foreign accents. Finally, our data bear on pragmatic theories of how speaker identity affects language comprehension and show how such theories offer an integrated framework for explaining how non-native language can lead to (sometimes unexpected) social meanings. 

A fundamental aspect of human cognition is the ability to parse our constantly unfolding experience into meaningful representations of dynamic events and to communicate about these events with others. How do we communicate about events we have experienced? Influential theories of language production assume that the formulation and articulation of a linguistic message is preceded by preverbal apprehension that captures core aspects of the event. Yet the nature of these preverbal event representations and the way they are mapped onto language are currently not well understood. Here, we review recent evidence on the link between event conceptualization and language, focusing on two core aspects of event representation: event roles and event boundaries. Empirical evidence in both domains shows that the cognitive representation of events aligns with the way these aspects of events are encoded in language, providing support for the presence of deep homologies between linguistic and cognitive event structure.